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INTRODUCTION  
 
There is an old adage that if an opportunity looks too good to be true, then 
it almost certainly is. Despite this, the law reports are filled with examples of 
people seeking redress for the fallout from “get rich quick” schemes that have 
gone wrong. One type of scam, exemplified by the fraudulent investment 
scheme run by Bernard Madoff from the United States and which collapsed in 
2008, is known as a “Ponzi1 scheme”.2 The wrongdoer in such a scheme 
invites “investments” promising a high rate of return. The funds subscribed 
are not in fact invested (or if they are, they are invested in vehicles which 
produce a lower rate of return than that promised). Instead, the money from 
new subscribers is used to pay the rewards to earlier subscribers. In due 
course the scheme is bound to collapse, because there will be a point at which 
the new funds coming in are insufficient to make the payments to existing 
subscribers, and the bubble of new investment can continue only for as long 
as there is confidence on the part of subscribers, encouraging fresh deposits. 
When the scheme begins to unravel, it falls apart very quickly, since the assets 
held by the wrongdoer are inevitably inadequate to reimburse all of the 
subscribers in full. In the ensuing insolvent liquidation, subscribers stand to 
recover only a small fraction of their subscription as unsecured creditors 
unless they can demonstrate that they have a proprietary interest in some of 
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1 Named after Charles Ponzi who ran a fraudulent investment scheme of this kind in 
the United States in the early 20th century. 
2 Another significant example is the Stanford International Bank, run by Sir Robert 
Stanford in Antigua. See Re Stanford International Bank Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 137. 
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the remaining assets. Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade 
Finance Ltd is a case involving what the judge at first instance called a 
“classic Ponzi scheme”.  
 
THE FACTS 
 
Carl Cushnie was (through a company he controlled) the major 
shareholder in Versailles Group plc (VGP). This company in turn had a 
trading subsidiary, Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (VTFL) whose business was 
ostensibly a modified form of factoring. In order to supposedly finance this 
business, investors paid in money through another company, Trading Partners 
Ltd (TPL) which was not part of the Versailles Group but in respect of which 
Mr Cushnie was a director. Furthermore, monies had been made available by 
various banks, in the main by way of secured lending. In fact, the money 
advanced by TPL to VTFL was not used in genuine trading activities. Instead, 
part of the funds were used to pay the purported profits to the investors, part 
was stolen by an associate of Mr Cushnie, and part was circulated (or “cross-
fired”) through companies within or associated with the Versailles Group to 
create an illusion that VTFL was trading at a substantial level. The tangled 
web of deceit deluded investors, banks, auditors, the stock exchange and the 
financial press into believing that the Versailles Group was a genuine and 
successful set of companies for some considerable time.
3
 Inevitably however 
the scheme collapsed, and in due course the banks appointed joint 
administrative receivers. 
The principal ways in which Mr Cushnie profited from the fraudulent 
enterprise were that he received dividends which were paid on the false basis 
that the Versailles Group was making distributable profits and more 
substantially, he received £28.69million from a sale of part of his 
shareholding in VGP. When the administrative receivers were appointed they 
pursued claims against Mr Cushnie (some of which were settled) and made 
substantial payments to the banks which had lent to VTFL.  
The claimants, Sinclair Investments, had invested through TPL and had 
also taken an assignment of TPL’s claims. They asserted two proprietary 
claims against the money received by the banks from the administrative 
receivers. The first was in respect of the proceeds of sale of the shares in 
VGP, which they claimed were held on constructive trust for TPL and the 
                                                   
3 In much the same way that Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, masked by a large 
volume of stock trading, escaped detection for at least a decade and possibly for as 
long as 30 years. The ability of fraudulent schemes of such magnitude as these 
escaping detection, and indeed, often receiving plaudits from the financial services 
industry and some financial journalists, raises serious issues about the effectiveness of 
industry regulation. 
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second was in relation to the monies which had passed from TPL to VTFL 
and were mixed with VTFL’s own monies.  
 
THE CLAIM TO THE FUNDS PAID TO VTFL 
 
The second of the proprietary claims was the less controversial. It was 
agreed that the claimants had a proprietary interest in the funds paid to VTFL. 
The funds originally received by TPL were held on trust (there was an express 
term of the contract with the subscribing investors to this effect), and the 
investors therefore retained a beneficial interest in those funds when they 
were paid to VTFL which received them subject to fiduciary duties contained 
in its management agreement with TPL. What was disputed was whether the 
claimants had the right to assert this claim against the banks since it was 
argued that it was impossible to trace any of the money through VTFL which 
was variously described as a “black hole” or a “maelstrom”. The Court of 
Appeal however upheld the decision of Lewison J at first instance that this 
was a valid claim. Even though the funds had been inextricably mixed with 
other money by VTFL, Lord Neuberger MR observed: 
 
“I do not doubt the general principle, reiterated by Lord Millett 
in Foskett v McKeown,4 that, if a proprietary claim is to be made 
good by tracing, there must be a clear link between the claimant's 
funds and the asset or money into which he seeks to trace. However, I 
do not see why this should mean that a proprietary claim is lost simply 
because the defaulting fiduciary, while still holding much of the 
money, has acted particularly dishonestly or cunningly by creating a 
maelstrom. Where he has mixed the funds held on trust with his own 
funds, the onus should be on the fiduciary to establish that part, and 
what part, of the mixed fund is his property.”5 
 
The Court concluded that both principle and authority supported that 
proposition, referring in particular to the fact that Lord Millett had specifically 
quoted with approval the observations of Page Wood V-C in Frith v Cartland
6
 
that “If a man mixes trust funds with his own, the whole will be treated as 
trust property, except so far as he may be able to distinguish what is his own”. 
TPL was thus able to maintain a claim to any funds which had been paid to 
VTFL and it was for the administrative receivers to show, on the balance of 
probabilities, that any funds received by them did not represent funds due to 
TPL. This claim against VTFL could also be maintained against the banks 
                                                   
4 [2001] 1 AC 102. 
5 [2011] EWCA Civ 347 at 138. 
6
 (1865) 2 H&M 417 at 418. 
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who received payments from the administrative receivers except to the extent 
that they could show that they received the funds without notice of the 
claimants’ equitable rights. The banks had received the first distributions in 
good faith and without such notice, but once they had been informed that the 
claimants had a proprietary claim they could no longer rely on this defence.  
 
THE CLAIM TO THE PROCEEDS OF SALE OF THE SHARES 
IN VGP 
 
A more complex issue related to the other proprietary claim made by the 
claimants. It was agreed that Mr Cushnie owed fiduciary duties to both TPL 
and VTFL. The claimants relied on the fact that Mr Cushnie was able to sell 
his shares in VGP at a substantial profit because as a director of TPL and in 
breach of his fiduciary duty he dishonestly misused TPL’s funds in the cross-
firing activities in order to inflate the apparent turnover and profits of VTFL, 
thereby increasing the supposed market value of its holding company VGP. 
Without the cross-firing it would have been obvious that VGP was in reality 
worthless. This profit in selling shares at an artificially inflated price, it was 
argued, was held on constructive trust and allowed the claimants to assert a 
proprietary claim in the proceeds of sale. This in turn permitted them to trace 
into the amounts received by the banks insofar as they had notice of the claim. 
On the face of it, this argument was supported by the decision of the Privy 
Council in Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid.
7
 This controversial 
decision
8
 held that where a dishonest fiduciary accepted a bribe (in that case a 
bribe taken for subverting the course of justice), a constructive trust was 
immediately imposed upon the recipient. This enabled the bribe to be traced 
into assets which were no longer in the possession or ownership of the 
fiduciary. The facts in the Versailles case were different, and the two 
situations might have been distinguished: the secret profit claimed in the 
Versailles case was not a bribe, nor the acquisition of a new asset by the 
dishonest fiduciary. It was, instead, an increase in the value of an asset (albeit 
otherwise worthless) already held by the fiduciary. The Court was of the 
view
9
 that nonetheless the unauthorised secret profit in the present case should 
be treated in the same way as a bribe, even though Mr Cushnie had not 
acquired the shares as a result of his breach and the profit was made as a 
shareholder and not a director of VTFL (indirectly through VGP). Despite 
this, the Court of Appeal declined to follow Reid. 
Lord Neuberger pointed out that as a general rule the Court of Appeal 
should follow its own previous decisions rather than a decision of the Privy 
                                                   
7 [1994] 1 AC 324. 
8 See Pearce “Personal and Proprietary Claims Against Bribees” [1994] LMCLQ 189. 
9
 [2011] EWCA Civ 347 at 56. 
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Council, although there might be an exception where it was a foregone 
conclusion that the Supreme Court would prefer the Privy Council decision.
10
 
Lord Neuberger did not think that this was a case where the Supreme Court 
would necessarily prefer the decision of the Privy Council.
11
 
In his view, the Court was instead bound by a series of contrary decisions 
of the Court of Appeal, commencing with the cases of Metropolitan Bank v 
Heiron
12
 and Lister & Co v Stubbs.
13
 In the first of these two cases a director 
of a company who had taken a bribe raised the defence of limitation in respect 
of an action brought against him by the company to recover the bribe. The 
Court of Appeal in that case held that a bribe received by a company director 
amounted to a debt owed in equity to that company which, by analogy to a 
legal action to recover a debt, would be subject to the same limitation period 
as governed by the Statute of Limitations; no proprietary claim (which would 
not have been subject to the limitation period) was available to the company. 
In Lister & Co v Stubbs an employee took bribes in return for selling his 
employer’s goods at a reduced price. Despite the clear association between the 
illicit profit made by the employee and the damage suffered by the employer, 
the Court of Appeal held that the obligation on the employee was simply a 
personal obligation to account, with no proprietary rights on the employer’s 
part attaching to the bribe or its proceeds. Lord Neuberger referred
14
 to the 
strong statement made by Lindley LJ:  
 
“…the relation between them is that of debtor and creditor; it is not 
that of trustee and cestui que trust. We are asked to hold that it is – 
which would involve consequences which, I confess, startle me. One 
consequence, of course, would be that, if [the employee] were to 
become bankrupt, this property acquired by him with the [bribe] 
would be withdrawn from the mass of his creditors and be handed 
over bodily to [the employer]. Can that be right? Another consequence 
would be that [the employer] could compel [the employee] to account 
to them, not only for the money with interest, but for all the profits 
which he might have made by embarking in trade with it. Can that be 
right? It appears to me that those consequences shew that there is 
some flaw in the argument.”15 
 
                                                   
10 Ibid at 73 to 74. 
11 Ibid at 76. 
12 (1880) 5 Ex D 319. 
13 (1890) 45 Ch D 1. 
14 [2011] EWCA Civ 347 at 66. 
15
 (1890) 45 Ch D 1 at15. 
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Those two cases had been followed in three subsequent decisions 
(Archer’s Case,16 Powell & Thomas v Evan Jones & Co,17 and, A-G's 
Reference (no 1 of 1985)
18
) and were supported by an earlier decision of the 
House of Lords, Tyrrell v Bank of London.
19
 The preference for the reasoning 
in Lister & Co v Stubbs was, moreover, supported by two decisions of the 
Court of Appeal following the Reid case, Gwembe Valley Development Co 
Ltd v Koshy (No 3),
20
 and Halton International Inc v Guernroy.
21,22
 
In his view, another reason for not following Reid was “that there is a real 
case for saying that the decision ... is unsound” continuing “There can ... be 
said to be a fundamental distinction between (i) a fiduciary enriching himself 
by depriving a claimant of an asset and (ii) a fiduciary enriching himself by 
doing a wrong to the claimant.”23 He further pointed out that much of the 
reasoning in Reid was circular;
24
 the Privy Council in Reid had 
misapprehended the extent to which Tyrrell v Bank of London was 
inconsistent with its decision,
25
 and the decision had been criticised in most 
academic commentaries.
26
 The result desired in the case (to deprive a false 
fiduciary of any profit) could have been achieved by means of an equitable 
account.
27
 On the merits of the decision, Lord Neuberger expressed his view 
that Lord Templeman in Reid “may have given insufficient weight to the 
potentially unfair consequences of the decision to other creditors, if his 
conclusion was right.”28 
 
COMMENTARY 
 
(1) Fiduciary duties give rise to personal obligations 
 
The duties of a fiduciary are essentially duties of loyalty: to subrogate his 
or her own interests to those of the principal, and to act with honesty and 
integrity. Whilst fiduciaries have frequently been confusingly described as 
                                                   
16 [1892] 1 Ch 322. 
17 [1905] 1 KB 11. 
18 [1986] 1 QB 491. 
19 (1862) 10 HL Cas 26. 
20 [2004] 1 BCLC 131. 
21 [2006] EWCA Civ 801. 
22 [2011] EWCA Civ 347 at 85. 
23 Ibid, at 80. 
24 Ibid, at 78. 
25 Ibid, at 61. 
26 Ibid, at 81. 
27 Ibid, at 79. 
28
 Ibid, at 83. 
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constructive trustees
29
 (the classic example of this ambiguous description 
being Boardman v Phipps
30
), a breach of fiduciary duty is not in essence 
substantially different from the breach of other duties such as contractual or 
tortious duties.
31
 The enforcement of duties in contract and in tort does not 
require the imposition of a proprietary remedy, nor does a breach of fiduciary 
duty, without more. This analysis of breach of fiduciary duty as giving rise to 
a personal liability only lies at the heart of both Metropolitan Bank v Heiron 
and Lister & Co v Stubbs.  
 
(2) When will a proprietary remedy be available? 
 
So when will a proprietary remedy be available against a fiduciary? There 
are two prime instances, both of which can be explained as examples of a 
fiduciary depriving a claimant of an asset. The first is where the assets 
claimed were originally beneficially owned by the claimant or have been 
acquired directly using funds owned beneficially by the claimant. Lord 
Neuberger explained the principle (by exclusion) in this way:  
 
“ … previous decisions of this court establish that a claimant cannot 
claim proprietary ownership of an asset purchased by the defaulting 
fiduciary with funds which, although they could not have been 
obtained if he had not enjoyed his fiduciary status, were not 
beneficially owned by the claimant or derived from opportunities 
beneficially owned by the claimant.”32  
 
In the Versailles case, there was no real defence to the claim that funds 
paid to TPL and held by it on an express trust could be traced into the hands 
of the banks which had received those funds to the extent that the original 
funds or their product could still be identified. Applying the principle as 
explained by Lord Neuberger, a proprietary right can additionally be asserted 
not just where property was from the outset beneficially owned by the 
claimant, but also where a trustee holds a right or opportunity exercisable on 
                                                   
29 There is a growing awareness of the desirability of being much clearer in the use of 
this term: see FHR European Venture LLP [2011] EWHC 299 where Simon J, 
following Versailles and Cadogon (below), said that he should have described a 
person who had gained financially through a breach of fiduciary duty as “accountable 
in equity” rather than as a “constructive trustee”. See also Paragon Finance plc v DB 
Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 at 408-409 (Millett LJ). 
30 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
31 See Shearman and Pearce “Exempting a Trustee for Gross Negligence” [2011] 
Denning LJ 181. 
32
 Above n 22, at 89. 
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behalf of the trust, and chooses to exercise the right or to exploit the 
opportunity for his or her own benefit. According to Lord Neuberger, this is 
one of the potential explanations of Keech v Sandford.
33
 
The second instance where a proprietary remedy can be exercised against 
a fiduciary is where assets are acquired by an agent acting on behalf of a 
principal. An agent acquiring property in accordance with the principal’s 
instructions does so on the principal’s behalf. As Lord Parker of Waddington 
said in Jacobus Marler Estates v Marler:
34
  
 
“an agent, whose duty it is to acquire property on behalf of his 
principal, cannot, without ... consent, acquire it on his own behalf and 
subsequently resell it to his principal at an enhanced price. In such a 
case the principal can treat the property as originally acquired for him 
and the resale as nugatory.”  
 
This principle applies only, however, where the agency already exists at 
the time the agent acquires the property: 
 
 “If it did not then exist the property acquired was, at the outset, the 
agent’s own property for all purposes, and the subsequent constitution 
of the relationship of principal and agent cannot deprive him of 
property already his own.”  
 
The agency need not have been formally constituted. In Tyrrell v Bank of 
London
35
 a solicitor knew that his client was interested in acquiring a piece of 
land. He bought the land himself. The House of Lords held that the solicitor 
was to be treated as having acquired the land on behalf of his client, so that he 
was a trustee of that part of the property in which his client was interested (but 
not of the remainder).  
 
(3) The agency principle 
 
There can be difficulties in identifying the limits of the two situations 
described above. Looking first at the limits to the agency principle, there can 
be little doubt that this applies where there is an expressly created agency. 
There will be comparatively little difficulty where the express purpose of the 
agency was for the agent to make the acquisition on behalf of the principal. 
                                                   
33 (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61. Another, and more satisfactory, explanation of the 
proprietary nature of the beneficiary’s right is that the extension of the lease was 
essentially a graft, enlarging the beneficiary’s existing proprietary interest. 
34 114 LT 640. See also A. B. Cook v George S. Deeks [1916] UKPC 10. 
35
 (1862) 10 HL Cas 26. 
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However, in the Tyrrell case the solicitor had not been appointed expressly as 
an agent for the purpose of acquiring the land concerned. The scope and limits 
of the agency therefore had to be implied. There may also be cases where it is 
even less clear that there is an agency at all. Lord Neuberger in Versailles 
described the agency principle in this way: 
 
“In cases where a fiduciary takes for himself an asset which, if he 
chose to take, he was under a duty to take for the beneficiary, it is easy 
to see why the asset should be treated as the property of the 
beneficiary. However, a bribe paid to a fiduciary could not possibly be 
said to be an asset which the fiduciary was under a duty to take for the 
beneficiary.”36 
 
Not everyone might agree with this final conclusion. After all, in many 
cases the receipt of the bribe will cause a direct financial loss to the 
beneficiary.
37
 However, Lord Neuberger’s conclusion is strongly supported by 
A-G's Reference (No. 1 of 1985).
38
 In that case a salaried pub manager, in 
addition to selling his employer’s beverages, purchased his own and sold them 
over the bar, pocketing the proceeds. It was held in a criminal prosecution that 
the money he received from customers did not belong to his employer, yet it 
would be hard to think of a case where the case for an implied agency would 
be stronger. The pub manager was doing what he was employed to do 
(namely to supply drinks across the bar); the customers would have assumed 
(if they knew the pub manager’s status) that he was selling the employer’s 
drinks and that he was receiving payment on the employer’s behalf; and all 
the legitimate payments he received were taken on the employer’s behalf and 
would have belonged to the employer. 
When, therefore, can a duty to acquire property on a principal’s behalf be 
implied? That is not at all clear. It may be, in view of the recent decision in 
Crossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd
39
 that negotiations for a joint venture may 
give rise to such a duty. In that case Etherton LJ, expressing a view with 
which the majority disagreed, suggested that the “Pallant v Morgan equity” 
cases should be seen as based upon the existence and breach of fiduciary 
duty,
40
 in most cases (including in Pallant v Morgan itself) because the 
evidence disclosed that the joint venture arrangement amounted to an agency 
or partnership.
41
 In Pallant v Morgan
42
 the two parties to the litigation had 
                                                   
36 Versailles [2011] EWCA Civ 347 at 80. 
37 This point is considered further below. 
38 [1986] QB 491. 
39 [2011] EWCA Civ 1619. 
40 Ibid at 88. 
41
 Ibid at 88. 
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agreed before an auction sale that they would not bid against each other, but 
that the property would be divided between them if the defendant’s agent was 
the successful bidder. The defendant sought to renege on the understanding 
after the sale. Harman J held that although the pre-auction agreement was not 
sufficiently clear to amount to a specifically enforceable contract, the 
defendant held the property on trust for both parties. The decision has been 
followed and applied on a number of occasions, most notably in Banner 
Homes Group plc v Luff Developments Ltd,
43
 a decision which was endorsed 
by the House of Lords in Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe.44 These 
cases suggest that the basis for the equity is a common intention constructive 
trust. The majority of the Court of Appeal in Crossco v Jordan (McFarlane LJ 
and Arden LJ) felt that the Court of Appeal was obliged to adopt this 
interpretation,
45
 but Etherton LJ considered that it could not survive strong 
indications in Stack v Dowden
46
 and Jones v Kernott
47
 that the common 
intention constructive trust was to “be seen clearly in retrospect as a specific 
jurisprudential response to the problem of a presumption of resulting trust and 
the absence of legislation for resolving disputes over property ownership 
where a married or unmarried couple have purchased property for their joint 
occupation as a family home.”48 It is open to the Supreme Court to prefer 
Etherton LJ’s view, but even if it does, there is a further question as to 
whether the fiduciary duty upon which Etherton LJ indicates the remedy 
should be based is sufficient to create a proprietary constructive trust through 
the implication of an agency, or whether the breach of fiduciary duty creates 
only personal rights and remedies.  
 
(4) The proprietary base 
 
It is similarly difficult to be certain where the limits are to the first 
principle, that a proprietary claim will succeed if there is a proprietary base 
because the assets being claimed were originally beneficially owned by the 
claimant, or they are directly derived from assets, a right, or an opportunity, 
beneficially owned by the claimant. Whilst the core of this principle is clear, 
the full extent of it is not.  
 
 
                                                                                                                         
42 Named after Pallant v Morgan [1953] Ch 43. 
43 [2000] Ch 372. 
44 [2008] UKHL 55. 
45 [2011] EWACA Civ 1619 at 120-122 and 128-130. 
46 [2007] 2 AC 432 at 40-46. 
47 [2011] UKSC 53 at 25, 56, 57, 61 and 78. 
48
 [2011] EWCA Civ 1619 at 85. 
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(5) Opportunities as property 
 
It is uncontroversial to suggest that assets can be followed in their original 
form, or traced into their exchange product.
49
 However, the concept that an 
opportunity can be beneficially owned is difficult.
50
 Not least among the 
obstacles to accepting that opportunities can be property is the very clearly 
expressed view of Lord Wilberforce in the House of Lords in National 
Provincial Bank v Ainsworth:
51
  
 
“Before a right or an interest can be admitted into the category of 
property, or of a right affecting property, it must be definable, 
identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by 
third parties and have some degree of permanence or stability.”  
 
These are not characteristics naturally associated with opportunities, 
which will frequently be vague and undefined, and transient in character. 
Opportunities can arise from a wide range of circumstances. At one end of 
the spectrum, it is easiest to conceive of an opportunity “belonging” to 
someone when it has arisen through the development of a new product or 
process through investment in research and development, particularly if this 
leads to intellectual property capable of formal legal protection such as 
copyright or the grant of a patent. However, if the logic of giving a proprietary 
remedy to the principal wishing to recover gains made by a fiduciary from the 
abuse of such an opportunity is that there is proprietary base for these gains, 
then surely the principal should equally be able to exercise proprietary 
remedies against anyone else who knowingly breaches the intellectual 
property rights of the principal by making a personal profit from the use of a 
patent or copyright material. 
Whilst there is no reason in logic or in principle why intangible property 
cannot be followed or traced,
52
 giving a proprietary remedy permitting the 
direct restoration of stolen or misappropriated intellectual property or the 
restitution of its direct substitute is a long way from accepting that there can 
be a proprietary interest in funds generated through the use of ideas protected 
by intellectual property legislation, and even less so where the opportunity is 
                                                   
49 See Pearce “A tracing paper” [1976] 40 Conv (ns) 277. 
50 See Tang Hand Wu “Confidence and the constructive trust” (2003) 23 Legal 
Studies 135 at 147. 
51 [1965] AC 1175 at1247-8.  
52 See Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10 where 
Stephen Morris QC, sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, allowed proprietary claims 
to succeed in respect of misappropriated European Union Allowances (tradeable 
carbon emission allowances). 
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not so protected. This may be better demonstrated by an analogy. If I steal 
watercolours painted by and belonging to the Prince of Wales, I can be 
compelled to return them, or to give up the proceeds I receive if I sell them. 
There will be proprietary remedies in both cases because the claim is to the 
original property or its exchange product. However, if I put the paintings on 
display and make a charge for people to view them, whilst I am almost 
certainly accountable for the profits I make (and I certainly will be where I 
acquired the paintings through the breach of an existing fiduciary duty), the 
remedy in respect of these profits is personal only since the profits do not 
represent the original property or its exchange product.
53
 It should make no 
difference where the property is intangible (such as copyright material) rather 
than tangible (such as the paintings). 
The case for arguing that the principal is the beneficial owner of an 
opportunity is much weaker in most other contexts. Many opportunities arise 
from the identification of a gap in the market, using information which is 
publicly available. It is hard to conceive of such opportunities belonging to 
anyone, even if they are identified by an employee or company director in a 
fiduciary position, perhaps with a responsibility to identify and exploit such 
opportunities. The case for giving the principal a proprietary remedy against a 
fiduciary wrongfully exploiting this kind of opportunity appears to be even 
weaker than that for giving a proprietary remedy to recover a bribe where it 
will frequently be the case (as in Lister v Stubbs) that the whole purpose of the 
payment of the bribe was to save at least an equivalent sum in what would 
otherwise have been paid to the principal.
54
 In Cadogan Petroleum
55
 counsel 
argued that bribe cases could be treated as examples of opportunities 
beneficially owned by the claimant since a bribe or secret commission would 
result in a reduction in the price otherwise payable to the claimant by at least 
as much as the amount of the bribe. Newey J was correctly not persuaded.
56
 
Even where the opportunity to make a personal gain arises from a specific 
approach suggesting a profitable business venture being made to the principal 
through the fiduciary,
57
 the real wrong done to the principal is the disloyalty 
of the fiduciary rather than the use of an asset which the principal owns. 
                                                   
53 The profits so made are not materially different from the profits made by the public 
house manager in A-G's Reference (No. 1 of 1985) [1986] QB 491. 
54 A bribe will not invariably confer a financial advantage, as in Reid, where the 
favour being sought was the perversion of a process.  
55 [2011] EWHC 2286. 
56 Ibid at 30. 
57 Or where the fiduciary acquires information through his position, as in Boardman v 
Phipps. 
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There are cases (reviewed by Lewison J in Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v 
Fielding)
58
 in which maturing business opportunities have been treated as 
“corporate property” so that directors cannot exploit them for their own 
benefit even after ceasing to be employed by the company, and if they do will 
be subject to a “constructive trust”. However, it does not follow from the use 
of the phrase constructive trust that a proprietary liability is imposed, and 
Lewison J in his careful review expressed the opinion that a company’s profits 
cannot be the subject of tracing or following.
59
 Since Lewison J links his 
review of the cases on corporate opportunities to the inability to trace into 
profits (which are not assets) it would appear to be his view that 
notwithstanding suggestions that corporate opportunities can be corporate 
property, this is merely a convenient description for opportunities in respect of 
which the company can assert rights, and that it does not follow from this 
description that there will be a proprietary remedy to recover any profits made 
by the exploitation of those opportunities, even if there may be a personal 
obligation to account. In any event, the cases also require review in the light 
of the criticism made in the Versailles case of the attempt in Reid to push out 
the boundaries of proprietary remedies. 
  
(6) Why seek a proprietary remedy? 
 
There are three main occasions when a claimant will seek to pursue a 
proprietary claim. The most usual is because the fiduciary is insolvent, as a 
proprietary claim will confer priority over the other creditors. Great care has 
to be taken in limiting the bounds of proprietary claims within proper limits 
lest there be an unfair impact upon the creditors.
60
 In the Versailles case Mr 
Cushnie’s frauds had made him appear extremely wealthy, and many people 
may have extended credit to him in the belief that his apparent wealth made 
him a good risk. The effects of the fraud impacted on a wide range of people. 
Can it convincingly be said that the “investors” in TPL were really any worse 
impacted than the investors who bought VGP shares at grossly inflated 
prices? Both were victims of exactly the same dishonest dealings. There is 
some authority which suggests that the victim of a fraudulent transaction may 
be able to obtain rescission and thereby restore equitable title to the extent 
                                                   
58 [2005] EWHC 1638 at 1332-1355. 
59 Ibid at [1470] to 1475. 
60 See Allen “Bribes and Constructive Trusts: A-G of Hong Kong v Reid” (1995) 58 
MLR 87 and also Lord Neuberger’s criticism of the Reid decision in Versailles [2011] 
EWCA Civ 347at 83. 
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necessary to support an equitable tracing claim.
61
 This might have allowed the 
investors who purchased shares in VGP to establish proprietary claims to the 
sums which they paid for the shares. Giving these investors a proprietary 
claim might help to redress the balance in their favour, but it would have the 
effect of further disadvantaging other creditors unable to establish a 
proprietary interest. There will therefore in due course need to be an 
evaluation of this line of authority. 
The second reason for making a proprietary claim is to enable the 
claimant to follow or trace an asset into the hands of a third party recipient of 
funds. This appears to have been a significant factor in the Reid case, where 
the funds which Reid had obtained through bribes had been “laundered” and 
invested in properties in New Zealand. In many large scale frauds, funds will 
have been laundered and dispersed, but creating a proprietary claim is against 
principle and as Lord Neuberger points out, is capable of having unfair 
consequences on other creditors.
62
  
Finally, a proprietary claim will be sought when an asset acquired using 
dishonestly or improperly generated funds has increased in value. Foskett v 
McKeown makes it clear that where a beneficiary’s funds can be traced into 
an asset which has increased in value, or otherwise generates assets greater 
than those used to acquire it, the beneficiary can make a claim to a 
proportionate share and is not restricted to a charge for a sum equal to the 
beneficiary’s loss. In Lister & Co v Stubbs the Court of Appeal viewed with 
equanimity the possibility of a dishonest fiduciary retaining profits made with 
the funds improperly acquired (see above). Most observers would be less 
content for a wrongdoer to be able to benefit in this way. But Lord Neuberger 
points out
63
 that it would be possible for equitable account to be used to 
deprive a wrongdoer of such gains. Equitable account is a tool of potentially 
very great flexibility, and provided that there is a debt due, as there very 
clearly is where a fiduciary has abused his or her position and thereby 
obtained an authorised profit or payment, there appears to be no reason of 
principle why equitable account could not be used to quantify both direct and 
indirect gains made by the fiduciary, although this would undoubtedly require 
development of the law beyond the limits clearly expressed in Lister & Co v 
Stubbs.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The rejection of Reid and the outcome in the Versailles case is welcome. 
Although the Versailles case has already been applied without criticism at 
first instance,
64
 inevitably a considerable measure of uncertainty will remain 
until the Supreme Court is able to review the law in this area. The Court of 
Appeal in Versailles could have avoided considering Reid and the other bribe 
cases. The taking of a bribe from a third party by a fiduciary and making a 
profit from it is very different from the taking of a beneficiary’s money and 
using it in such a way that it ultimately increases the value of assets already 
owned by the fiduciary. Lord Neuberger himself said that there “was 
undoubtedly a close commercial causal connection between Mr Cushnie’s 
misuse of the funds in which he owed fiduciary duties to TPL, and the money 
which he made on the sale of the Shares”.65 But because this was not a case 
where the claimants were purporting to follow their assets into the profits, the 
court was prepared to equate it to bribe cases inasmuch as in both instances 
the receipt of the money by the fiduciary derived from his breach of fiduciary 
duties. This seems to be casting the net very widely. The refusal to follow 
Reid was not inevitable: the law abounds with instances where a decision of 
the Privy Council has changed English law. The decision to prefer Lister & 
Co v Stubbs, whilst justified on the detailed reasoning in this case, also 
reflects a policy decision to limit the scope of proprietary remedies, and 
endorses the view that the normal remedy for a breach of fiduciary duty is a 
personal remedy only. 
The suggestion – albeit with a number of caveats – that equitable account 
could be used to deprive a fiduciary of profits made through the investment or 
other use of misappropriated funds certainly merits further exploration. Lord 
Neuberger recognised that existing authority does not create a strong basis for 
such an extension, and indeed Lister & Co v Stubbs contains unambiguous 
remarks which are inconsistent with this use of equitable accounting. 
Nonetheless, to deprive the fiduciary of profits derived from exploiting the 
proceeds of his misdeeds, prevents the scandal of a dishonest fiduciary 
profiting from his wrongdoing, and could be considered to have a 
prophylactic effect by creating an environment in which false fiduciary will 
have the worst of both worlds – being obliged to cover any loss which the 
fiduciary’s actions have occasioned, but never being able to retain a profit, 
even one made indirectly. To do this by way of equitable account is certainly 
far more satisfactory than engineering a proprietary right to achieve the same 
result. 
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